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COPYING IN PATENT LAW*
CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA** AND MARK A. LEMLEY***
Patent law is virtually alone in intellectual property (IP) in
punishing independent development. To infringe a copyright or
trade secret, defendants must copy the protected IP from the
plaintiff, directly or indirectly. But patent infringement requires
only that the defendant's product falls within the scope of the
patent claims. Not only doesn't the defendant need to intend to
infringe, but the defendant may be entirely unaware of the patent
or the patentee and still face liability.
Nonetheless, copying does play a role in some subsidiary patent
doctrines, including damages rules, willfulness, and obviousness.
More significantly, the rhetoric of patent law (and of IP law
more generally) often seems to presuppose that defendants in
patent cases are in fact engaged in copying. Similarly, the
outcome of public policy debates over patent reform may well
turn on the perception of patent infringers as either bad actors or
as innocent businesspeople who accidentally ran afoul of a
patent.
Unfortunately, no one seems to know whether patent
infringement defendants are in fact unscrupulous copyists or
independent developers. In this paper, we seek to answer that
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question. We look both at the allegations made in a random
sample of complaints and at the treatment of copying in recent
reported decisions, including willfulness decisions. We find that
a surprisingly small percentage of patent cases involve even
allegations of copying, much less proof of copying. Copying in
patent law seems to be very much the exception, not the rule,
except in the pharmaceutical industry.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent law is virtually alone in intellectual property ("IP") law in
punishing independent development. To infringe a copyright or trade
secret, defendants must copy the protected IP from the plaintiff,
directly or indirectly.' But patent infringement requires only that the
defendant's product falls within the scope of the patent claims. It's
not just that patent law doesn't require any intent to infringe. The
defendant may be entirely unaware of the patent or the patentee and
still face liability for independently creating a similar work.
Nonetheless, copying does play a role in some subsidiary patent
doctrines, as we discuss in Part I. For example, the question of
whether patent damages should be set in order to deter infringement,
rather than solely to compensate the patentee, depends critically on
whether infringers are in fact aware they are infringing, or at least
that they are using the plaintiff's technology. The definition of
"willful infringement" turns on the question of culpability, at least in
the popular understanding of that term. Copying-or at least intent
to infringe-is also an element of claims for indirect infringement.2
More significantly, the rhetoric of patent law (and of IP law more
generally) often seems to presuppose that defendants in patent cases
are in fact engaged in copying. Similarly, the outcome of public
policy debates over patent reform may well turn on the perception of
patent infringers as either bad actors or as innocent businesspeople
who accidentally ran afoul of a patent.
Unfortunately, no one seems to know whether most patent
infringement defendants are in fact unscrupulous copyists or
independent developers. In this Article, we seek to shed light on that
question. Because copying is not an element of any patent cause of
action, courts do not normally make explicit findings as to whether
defendants have copied. Instead, we turn in Part II to a variety of
1. The Copyright Act defines the rights as ones involving a "copy" of a protected
work, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006), and courts are unanimous in requiring proof of copying,
though that copying need not be intentional or even conscious. See ROBERT P. MERGES
ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 476-82 (rev. 4th
ed. 2007). Similarly, trade secret law requires that the secret be acquired from the
plaintiff, and makes independent development a defense. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1, cmt. 1, 14 U.L.A. 529, 538 (2000) ("Proper means include ... [d]iscovery by
independent invention."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995).
For our definition of copying, see infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (detailing copying's relevance in a
claim of indirect infringement).
2009] 1423
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
proxies to try to identify the subset of cases in which copying is
alleged or proven. We look both at the allegations made in a random
sample of complaints and at the treatment of copying in recent
reported decisions.
We find that a surprisingly small percentage of patent cases
involve even allegations of copying, much less proof of copying. Only
10.9% of the complaints studied-21 of 193 complaints-contained
even an allegation that the defendant copied the invention, either
from the patent or from the plaintiff's commercial product. This
percentage is even lower when looking at published decisions, with
6.89% of the decisions-129 of 1871 cases-including an allegation of
copying. Copying was found in 33 of these cases, meaning that
copying was established in only 1.76% of all cases in our dataset.
Copying seems to be the exception, not the rule in patent cases. And
our data indicates that copying is particularly rare outside of the
pharmaceutical and chemical arts. Pharmaceutical and chemical cases
constitute more than half of the allegations of copying in both
complaints and decisions and two-thirds of the reported findings of
copying. In other industries, such as computers and software, less
than 3% of cases involve allegations of copying, and less than 1%
involve proof of copying.
Our findings have significant implications for both patent theory
(which often depends on assumptions about the role of patent
disclosure and improvements) and patent policy. In particular, we
caution against the modern trend of treating infringers as bad actors
when assessing damages; overwhelmingly, they are not. We discuss
these and other implications in Part III.
I. COPYING'S CURRENT PLACE IN PATENT DOCTRINE
One of the most significant differences between patent law and
other areas of intellectual property is that, in patent law, copying is
irrelevant to the determination of infringement.3 It is axiomatic that
patent infringement is a "strict liability offense."4 However, many
components of patent law, patent theory, and even the rhetoric used
3. See Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention
Defence in Intellectual Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535, 535 (2002) ("Perhaps the most basic
difference between patents and other intellectual property such as trade secrets and
copyright is that independent invention is not a defence to infringement.").
4. Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1525 (2007).
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in patent cases make copying a relevant consideration. Proposed
reforms to the patent system would make copying even more directly
relevant.
A. Copying is Not Required to Prove Liability
Courts assess patent infringement by comparing the allegedly
infringing product or process to the patent's claims. An individual
literally infringes if her technology practices each and every element
of the claimed invention.6  Patent law requires nothing more.
Questions of infringement do not focus on the alleged infringer's
intent.7 Nor does infringement require evidence of copying the
patent or commercial embodiments of the patented invention.8 For
the initial liability determination in patent law, an "innocent"
infringer is treated the same as an individual who copied the patented
technology. Put simply, copying is irrelevant to the issue of liability.
Nor is copying relevant to the determination of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents. Determining whether the alleged
infringer's actions, while not falling within the literal scope of the
claims, are equivalent to the claimed subject matter does not involve
an inquiry into the infringer's state of mind or actions of copying.9
The Supreme Court of the United States has specifically held that
copying (or its absence) is irrelevant to infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.10
Accordingly, in patent law, an individual who develops an
already-patented technology without knowledge of the patent and the
5. Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(explaining that copying plays no role in the claim for allegedly infringing product or
process comparison); see ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF
PATENT LAW 275 (2004).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,
374 (1996) ("Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim
'covers the alleged infringer's product or process . ) (quoting HERBERT SCHWARTZ,
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 80 (2d ed. 1995)).
7. ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 781 (4th ed. 2007) ("[T]he right to exclude does not depend upon the
infringer's state of mind."); SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 5, at 275 ("A defendant's
intent is irrelevant to the outcome of an infringement inquiry.").
8. See Allen Eng'g, 299 F.3d at 1351; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 781 (noting
that 35 U.S.C. § 271 "does not require any proof of access to the inventor's work").
9. Allen Eng'g, 299 F.3d at 1351 (indicating that copying is irrelevant to the
equivalents inquiry).
10. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35-36 (1997)
(concluding that "intent plays no role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents").
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technology's prior creation-a true "independent inventor"-is still
liable if what she independently created falls within the scope of the
patent's claims. Liability of an independent inventor turns solely on
the question of timing, not the independent nature of the second
inventor's actions. As long at the patent's inventor was the first to
invent the claimed technology, she can exclude anyone else who
develops the claimed technology, independently or not." The first
individual to conceive of the invention-that is, mentally visualize the
complete invention'-has superior rights to all future developers as
long as she is diligent in either bringing her invention to the patent
office or actually reducing the invention to practice from the time of
conception by another inventor. 3 The second conceiver can even be
the first to put the invention to actual use and still be considered an
infringer. 4
The lack of a copying requirement for liability places patent law
in sharp contrast with copyright and trade secret law. Copyright law,
as its name connotes, requires an individual to copy the protected
work to be found liable. 5 While doctrines such as subconscious
11. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 781.
12. "Conception is the 'formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in
practice.' " Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (quoting 1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890)). "Conception is the touchstone of
inventorship ...." Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006) (defining the standard for determining priority between
two inventors of the same technology); Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (articulating the standard in reverse and noting that "priority of invention goes to
the first party to reduce an invention to practice unless the other party can show that it
was the first to conceive of the invention and that it exercised reasonable diligence in later
reducing that invention to practice"); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 7, at 440-41.
Reduction to practice is established by either actually implementing the invention or filing
an enabling patent application. See Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1169
(Fed. Cir. 2006). An actual reduction to practice that has been "abandoned, suppressed,
or concealed" does not count for priority purposes. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
14. Again, this holds true as long as the first conceiver is diligent from the "time prior
to the conception by the other." 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
15. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946). Some circuits allow
copying to be established by a "striking similarity" between the protected work and
infringing works, even if there is no evidence that the alleged infringer had any access to
the copyrighted work. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1988). But see
Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring proof of access even with a
finding of striking similarity). Under such a test, some might argue that copying is not
required to establish copyright infringement. However, the rationale for relying solely on
striking similarity is that such evidence "preclude[s] the possibility of independent
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copying potentially remove the state of mind from the copying
requirement, 6 actual copying is still a fundamental first step in
determining copyright infringement. 7
Trade secret law is similar, requiring an individual to
misappropriate the trade secret to be held liable. Misappropriation
occurs when the trade secret is obtained through improper means or
through a breach of confidence.18 Either trigger for liability entails a
"copying" of the trade secret. The infringer obtains the information
from someone else-in most cases the trade secret's creator. 9 And
while trade secret law does preclude the use of information acquired
by accident or mistake,2" the information must still be acquired from
the trade secret owner and used with knowledge that it was
inadvertently disclosed. By contrast, independent creation of the
information, through normal means or reverse engineering, is a
complete defense against a trade secret allegation.2
Trademark law occupies a middle ground. Trademark
infringement is based upon a finding of likely consumer confusion,
which can occur without copying of the mark by the defendant. But
intent to copy or deceive is one of the factors courts use in deciding
consumer confusion, 2  and recent work by Barton Beebe has found
creation." Ferguson v. NBC, Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, copying is still
established essentially by inference.
16. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998-99 & n.12
(2d Cir. 1983) (finding liability even though the copying was subconscious and without
intent); see also R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A
History, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 178-79 (2007) (detailing the irrelevance of intent in
modern copyright law).
17. See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The
Copyright Act forbids only copying; if independent creation results in an identical work,
the creator of that work is free to sell it.").
18. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 529, 537-38 (2000);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995).
19. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-17
(5th Cir. 1970) (finding liability where the infringer obtained the trade secret by improper
means, namely, by taking aerial photographs of a trade secret holder's chemical plant
under construction); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375-77 (7th Cir. 1953) (finding
liability via a breach of confidence where the infringer obtained the trade secret in
confidential negotiations with the trade secret holder).
20. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 ("Independent
discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper
means of acquisition."); Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 535.
22. See Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Foods Imports Co., Inc., 703
F.2d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that intent is "pertinent to a determination of
2009] 1427
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that, in fact, evidence of intent is the most significant factor predicting
a finding of trademark infringement.23 So, as a practical matter,
trademark infringement usually involves copying, or at least a
defendant's awareness of the plaintiff's mark. Patent law, then,
stands alone among IP rights in not requiring or at least not strongly
weighting evidence of copying.
B. Copying Plays a Role in Other Patent Doctrines
While copying isn't necessary for infringement, the existence of
copying is not completely irrelevant in patent law. Many doctrines
outside of the initial determination of infringement consider whether
the alleged infringer or a third party has copied the patented
technology. Some patent theory assumes, as a precondition, that
others will copy the patented technology. Finally, much of the
rhetoric used by courts and commentators when discussing patent
infringement invokes the concepts of a copier and copying when
identifying the infringer and describing her actions.
1. Copying as an Element of Specific Patent Doctrines
Whether a finding of patent infringement was the result of
copying is relevant to the question of willful infringement and the
accompanying enhancement of damages.24 "Willful infringement is
... a measure of reasonable commercial behavior in the context of
the tort of patent infringement. '25 The act of copying the patented
technology evidences the infringer's "disregard[] [for] the property
rights of the patentee" and "the deliberateness of the tortious acts.
26
Patent law views such copying as "reprehensible" and, in turn, worthy
likelihood of confusion"); Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d
Cir. 1961) (indentifying "the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own
mark" as one of the variables for determining likelihood of confusion).
23. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1608 (2006) ("The court found an intent to confuse
consumers in sixty-seven opinions. In sixty-five (97%) of these opinions, the court found
an overall likelihood of confusion.").
24. See In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
("Because patent infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only
relevant in determining whether enhanced damages are warranted."); Knorr-Bremse
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (en banc). A finding of willfulness is required to enhance damages but does not
require such an enhancement. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368.
25. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
26. Id.
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of punitive damages in the form of enhanced damages.27 Courts have
even justified raising a reasonable royalty award to compensate for
copying despite a finding that the infringement wasn't willful.
28
Notably, while copying is evidence of willful infringement, copying is
not required to prove willful infringement.2 9 In fact, as we shall see,
most willfulness claims do not involve allegations of copying at all.
Nor does evidence of copying, by itself, mean the infringement is
willful.3 °
Copying is also relevant to the issue of patent validity as a
secondary consideration of nonobviousness.1  Copying of the
patented invention by the infringer or a third party is seen by patent
law as an indicator that the invention is nonobvious 2 The rationale
is that a competitor engages in such copying only if they need a
solution to the problem the invention addresses and they cannot
come up with one on their own.33 Patent law also assumes that others
copy only those inventions of technical value.34 Both of these
assumptions based on the existence of copying are indicators that the
27. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348-49.
28. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(expressing a concern that a reasonable royalty that is too low would "create a windfall for
infringers" who intentionally engage in unauthorized use of the patented technology; the
court in that case had rejected a willfulness claim).
29. See, e.g., Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-
90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (setting out a multi-factor test to use in considering willfulness).
30. Id.
31. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 26 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the
copying of the "claimed invention, rather than one in the public domain, is indicative of
unobviousness" (quoting Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1000 (Fed.
Cir. 1986))).
32. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285-86 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing the infringer's copying of the patented invention as evidence of
nonobviousness).
33. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 816 F.2d 617, 622 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("The copying of an
invention may constitute evidence that the invention is not an obvious one.... This would
be particularly true where the copyist had itself attempted for a substantial length of time
to design a similar device, and had failed."); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness as
an Exercise in Gap Measuring, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH 21, 32 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) ("A competitor only engages in copying if they
need a solution to the problem the invention addresses and they cannot come up with a
solution on their own."). That rationale is open to question, however. A company may
copy an invention not because it had no choice, but because it thought the invention was
unpatented or unpatentable and therefore free to be used without need for reinvention.
34. See Cotropia, supra note 33, at 32.
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invention meets the nonobviousness requirement and is worthy of
patent protection.
Third, copying is relevant to some claims for indirect
infringement. Specifically, the Federal Circuit has made it clear that a
defendant is not liable for inducing infringement by another unless it
intended that the conduct it induced infringe a known patent.36 An
inducement claim doesn't necessarily involve copying-a defendant
might independently develop a technology, then learn of a patent
covering it, and still encourage another to infringe that patent.
However, the fact that inducement requires both knowledge of the
patent and intent to encourage infringement means that inducement
is more likely than ordinary infringement cases to involve allegations
of copying.37
Finally, as an exception to the general rule that copying is
irrelevant to the question of liability, an accusation of infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) almost by definition involves acts of
copying. Section 271(e)(2)(A) allows a patent holder to sue a generic
drug manufacturer who files an abbreviated new drug application
("ANDA") that contains a paragraph IV certification.38 Such a
certification alleges that the previously approved drug to which an
ANDA pertains is covered by patents that are invalid or will not be
infringed by the generic drug.39 In order to file a proper and
successful ANDA, the generic drug manufacturer must "copy" the
original drug-the generic's active ingredient must be the
bioequivalent of the listed drug.4" These sets of facts that give rise to
35. See id. (concluding that copying provides second-order evidence that the
technology gap between the prior art and the invention is such that patent protection is
warranted).
36. See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
37. Contributory infringement, by contrast, requires knowledge of the existence of the
patent but not specific intent to infringe. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement,
Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1964). These claims too must involve awareness of the
patentee's technology but are less likely to involve copying.
38. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2006); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp.,
212 F.3d 1241, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2000). "A charge of infringement under § 271(e)(2) is
technical in nature" given that the ANDA filer has only sought FDA approval.
SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 5, at 287.
39. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006) (describing the content of a
paragraph IV certification).
40. An ANDA is proper only if the generic drug's active ingredient is the
"bioequivalent" of the already approved drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). A
generic drug is bioequivalent if the extent and rate of absorption of the drug are not
significantly different from that of the already approved drug. See § 355(j)(8)(B)(i).
1430 [Vol. 87
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a § 271(e)(2) allegation of infringement mean that the generic drug
producer has copied the patent holder's technology. 1 It does not,
however, necessarily mean that the patented invention was copied; the
patent might cover something other than the active ingredient to
which the generic is bioequivalent 2
2. Copying as a Foundation for Particular Patent Theories
Copying also plays a role in a number of patent theories. The
idea that a patent constitutes a bargain with the public, in which the
patentee gets exclusivity for a limited time in exchange for giving the
public information about the invention, presupposes that companies
will read and learn from the patent in order to copy the invention
(albeit after the patent has expired). Improvement theory assumes
that one of the patent law's benefits is that others refer to the patent
document and the technology it describes in order to build upon that
technology. Design-around theory assumes that others read patents
in order to create competing, noninfringing alternatives to the
patented technology. The doctrine of equivalents is also grounded in
the assumption that defendants copy from patent owners. One view
of that doctrine is that it is meant to catch the "unscrupulous copyist"
who has set out to copy the patented technology and makes a minor
change in order to avoid infringement via a technicality.
a. The Disclosure Bargain and Improvement Theory
The improvement theory of patent law describes patenting as a
mechanism to both assist and prompt others to develop
41. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the ANDA process "emerged from Congress' efforts to balance
two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms to make the
investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously
enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market"); Takeda
Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Lab., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("When
filing the ANDA the applicant must make a certification regarding any patent protecting
the drug that will be copied.").
42. An ANDA could be filed by an independent drug developer who was second to
invent and must therefore go through the ANDA process to produce and sell the new
pharmaceutical. This ANDA filer must still, however, claim bioequivalence. As a
practical matter, this is a very uncommon occurrence. See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 194 (1999) (noting that the main purpose behind the ANDA
process is to encourage generic drug manufacturers to enter the market).
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improvements to the already-patented technology.43 The patent
disclosure, which is required to be enabling, provides technical
information about the claimed invention.4 This technical information
is publicly available and readily accessible, allowing anyone to both
learn about the patented technology and then use this information to
copy the invention once the patent expires or to create an
improvement during the patent term.45  Building upon existing
patented technology is a fundamental aspect of the patent system,
and such improvements are crucial to technological advancement.
46
When such improvements are patented, another fundamental
concept in patent law comes into play-blocking patents. The
blocking patent's story begins with an inventor developing and
patenting a base technology and then an improver building upon that
base technology and patenting the improvement.47  This situation
gives rise to two patents-one covering the base technology and one
covering the improvement. Any party wishing to practice the
improvement must get licenses from both the original developer and
43. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) ("[Patent law]
promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation .... "); Craig Allen
Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 36-37 (2000)
(indicating that one of the fundamental policies of patent law is to stimulate future
innovation through the disclosure requirement).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (2006) (setting forth the requirement that the patent
disclosure enable the claimed invention); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (describing the enablement requirement in patent law, which requires that
"one skilled in the art, after reading the specification, could practice the claimed invention
without undue experimentation").
45. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989)
(describing the "range of ideas available as the building blocks of further innovation");
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
267 (1994) ("On issuance, a patent communicates a considerable amount of information
that can help other would-be inventors, including rival firms."). But see Timothy R.
Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 130-47 (2006) (questioning
whether patent law truly promotes the disclosure of the invention); Note, The Disclosure
Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereo), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2007-08 (2005)
(same).
46. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884-908 (1990) (detailing how various technology
industries develop incrementally); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30-31 (1991)
(balancing the incentives required for first inventors and improvers building on that first
invention).
47. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 1009-10 (1997) (noting that a "significant improvement" may be "itself
protected by a patent"); Merges & Nelson, supra note 46, at 860-62.
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the improver.48 The availability of patent protection for the improver,
which creates the blocking patent, encourages the creation of the
improvement because of the bargaining power patent exclusivity
gives to the improving inventor. 9 In the end, patent law facilitates
the creation of improvements by both communicating the existence
and technical details of the base technology and then providing patent
protection for any patentable improvements that are developed.
The theory that the patent system facilitates and encourages
improvements assumes that potential improvers learn about the base
technology from either the patent itself or a commercial embodiment
of the patented invention. The improver is viewed as leveraging off
of the earlier patent's technical description, and, in some instances,
actually communicating and coordinating with the developer of the
base technology. This all assumes some level of copying, or, at the
very least, an awareness of the base technology and patent that sparks
some modification to what has already been done. If there is no
copying, then there is no improving from the viewpoint of the follow-
on inventor. She is, from her perspective, starting from scratch." For
the patent system to play a role in improving technology, the base
technology the system encourages must be known and used in some
way by the improver. If she has not copied, her invention is not an
improvement at all, but independent development of a better
alternative (a "leapfrogging" invention).
48. Lemley, supra note 47, at 1010 ("The original patent owner can prevent the
improver from using his patented technology, but the improver can also prevent the
original patent owner from using the improvement. Unless the parties bargain, no one
gets the benefit of the improvement.").
49. See id. at 1013. This power is by no means absolute, and a bargaining breakdown
could nullify the benefit of the blocking patent. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75,
82-91 (1994) (detailing and providing real-world examples of the bargaining breakdown
between the base and improvement patent holders).
50. This is not to say that a new technology is only an "improvement" if the improver
actually references and uses an earlier technology in development of the new technology.
Even if she thinks she is "starting from scratch," the result is still objectively an
improvement to the earlier technology. State of mind is irrelevant to the definition of
improvement. However, patent law's improvement theory focuses on the earlier category
of improvements-ones in which the improver actually uses the base technology as the
starting point for the new technology.
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b. Design-Around Theory
Design-around theory is a subset of the improvement theory.
The theory is that the patent system sparks a specific type of
"improvement"-a substitute to the patented technology that does
not infringe the patent.5 1 A competitor, faced with the possibility of
infringing the patent in order to compete in a given industry, reads
the patent in order to determine how they can "design-around" the
boundaries of the patent's claims. 2 The patent, by promoting the
creation of a commercial substitute through this design-around
process, is socially beneficial. 3  The Federal Circuit has
acknowledged that encouraging design-arounds is a goal of the patent
system: "One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called
'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even
when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to
the marketplace."54
The design-around theory, like the improvement theory, assumes
that the competitor who chooses to design around is aware of and
working from the plaintiff's patent. Here, the theory assumes that the
competitor reads the patent's claims when designing a competing
product with the goal of making sure that the developed product does
not fall within the patent's exclusivity. A successful design-around
does not copy every element of the claimed technology; one might
question whether they are really "copying" at all. But one who
designs around an invention necessarily refers to and uses the
patented invention in developing the competing product or process,
and often uses the patented invention in the course of developing the
noninfringing alternative.
51. See Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
("Designing around patents is ... one of the ways in which the patent system works to the
advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional
purpose.").
52. See Nard, supra note 43, at 40-41 ("As the term 'design-around' suggests, a
competitor of the patentee may purposefully circumvent the boundaries of the patent
claim and create a competitive, noninfringing alternative to the claimed invention.").
53. Id.
54. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). For
further discussion, see generally Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law,
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001).
55. As Carl Shapiro has pointed out to us, design-arounds standing alone aren't
socially valuable; it is the improvements they spark that the law really wants to encourage.
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c. Doctrine of Equivalents Theory
One justification for the doctrine of equivalents also assumes
copying by potential infringers. As has already been mentioned, the
U.S. Supreme Court specifically dismissed evidence of the infringer's
copying of the patented invention (or alternatively, of the infringer's
efforts to design around the invention) as irrelevant to the doctrine of
equivalents inquiry.56 But the early judicial rationale behind the
doctrine of equivalents built upon concepts of fairness and equity to
justify the doctrine's existence.5 ' The Supreme Court concluded that
limiting protection to the claim's literal scope allowed someone "to
make unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the
patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take the
copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside the reach of
law."58 Denying the patentee access to the doctrine of equivalents
"would leave room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous
copyist."59
This reasoning assumes that there are individuals who target
patented technologies, looking to appropriate the core value of the
invention but to avoid being found liable for patent infringement by
making minor variations. While this is not the only rationale for the
doctrine,' courts today, when discussing the rationale behind the
doctrine of equivalents, still refer to the doctrine as a means to
capture copiers.61
56. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35-36 (1997).
57. See Christopher A. Cotropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 159-60 (2005) (detailing the doctrine's initial
focus on notions of fairness and equity); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention,
Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93
GEO. L.J. 1947, 1964-67 (2005) (noting that, into the twentieth century, "fairness concerns
continued to dominate thinking about the doctrine of equivalents").
58. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950); see
also Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 36 ("[O]ne wonders how to distinguish between the
intentional copyist making minor changes to lower the risk of legal action, and the
incremental innovator designing around the claims, yet seeking to capture as much as is
permissible of the patented advance.").
59. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
60. See Cotropia, supra note 57, at 160-62 (noting the current emphasis on a
utilitarian theory of the doctrine and a focus on after-arising technologies); Meurer &
Nard, supra note 57, at 1967-68 (describing the modern "friction theory" of the doctrine of
equivalents).
61. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860-61
(N.D. II. 2007) (quoting Graver Tank's copying discussion to describe the "import of the
doctrine of equivalents").
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3. Copying as a Rhetorical Device
The concept of copying also plays a role in the rhetoric used by
courts and commentators when discussing patent infringement. An
infringer of a patent claim is often said to have "copied, 62 the
invention and, in turn, is labeled a "copier "63 or "copyist."'6  This
terminology is used even when the infringer actually independently
developed the infringing product or process. Likewise, an
independent invention is often identified as a "copy"65 of an earlier
patent though technically it was independently created. Such rhetoric
even rises to the level of labeling the infringer a "thief" 66 or their
actions "stealing. ,
67
The use of the term copying and its derivatives to characterize
infringement is notable, given that patent law does not premise
infringement on copying. The law places heavy weight on language;
in turn, courts and commentators have an obligation to use language
accurately. The linguistic slide from "infringer" to "copier" to "thief"
presupposes that anyone who infringes is also copying and therefore
stealing. That is an empirical proposition-and, as we show in Part II,
a false one. Second, terms such as copying come with heavy baggage.
They are loaded-"carry[ing] an undercurrent of disapproval, of
62. See, e.g., SPX Corp. v. Bartec, USA, LLC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (E.D. Mich.
2008) (characterizing the allegation as one that "Bartec USA, LLC (Bartec) copied [the
patented] design for a handheld tool used in servicing tires on motor vehicles equipped
with remote tire monitoring systems," even though no actual allegation of copying was
identified) (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Inc., 998 F.2d 985, 991 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (referring to patent infringers in general as "copiers").
64. See, e.g., Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Corp., No. 01 C 6934, 2004 WL
2260626, at *12 (N.D. I11. Oct. 1, 2004) ("A patent holder is protected from efforts of
copyists to evade liability for infringement by making only insubstantial changes to a
patented invention." (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535
U.S. 722, 726 (2002))).
65. See, e.g., Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 41-42 (1929) ("There is
a substantial identity, constituting infringement, where a device is a copy of the thing
described by the patentee ....").
66. See, e.g., Victoria E. Luxardo, Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegitimate
Patent Enforcement Practices in the United States: An Equitable Affirmative Defense of
'Fair Use' in Patent, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 791, 825-26 (2006) (calling corporations who
infringe individual inventors' patents "patent thieves").
67. See, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d.
Cir. 1948) (Hand, J.) (identifying the doctrine of equivalents as a vehicle to "prevent an
infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention").
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unfavorable practices, of 'it's just not on.' "68 Allowing the use of the
terms is particularly detrimental in jury cases because "a juror's
everyday experience, stemming from earliest school days, generates
the lay biases and pejorative flavor the word 'copy' carries."6 9 Finally,
copying rhetoric is important because it may reflect reality or, if
repeated enough, become reality. Scholars in the patent area have
focused before on rhetoric as an indicator of what was7" or of what is
coming.
71
C. Reforms to Copying's Role in Patent Law
Finally, a number of commentators and legislators have
proposed reforms that give copying a larger role in patent law. These
reforms target copying's role in determining infringement and take
the form of various degrees of independent inventor defenses.
In its purest form, an independent inventor defense absolves any
patent infringer of liability unless the infringement resulted from
copying the claimed invention. That is, "independent conception of
the invention and independent reduction of it to practice" would be a
complete defense to infringement.72 Such an absolute defense does
not exist in the United States.
Stephen Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer articulate two
advantages to an independent inventor defense. 73 First, the threat of
market entry by an independent inventor forces the patent holder to
license at a lower price, reducing deadweight loss.74 In addition, the
availability of an independent inventor defense also "reduces entry
68. Kenneth R. Adamo et al., The Curse of "Copying," 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 296, 297 (2008).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
953, 959-67 (2007) (investigating the "Jefferson story of patent law" by focusing, in part,
on Thomas Jefferson's words).
71. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1033-41 (2005) (relying on the rising rate of court usage of the terms
"intellectual property" and "free riding" as evidence that courts are viewing intellectual
property more and more as a species of real property).
72. Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
MICH. L. REV. 475,484 (2006).
73. Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 545. Vermont criticized Maurer &
Scotchmer's analysis because it "assum[ed] a potential [independent inventor] can
evaluate a patented invention and still invent independently." Vermont, supra note 72, at
482.
74. Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 545.
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into the [patent] race, and thus reduces wasteful duplication."75 One
of their only concerns with such a defense is that "fraudulent claims
of independence may be undetectable.,
76
Samson Vermont argues for a modified independent inventor
defense." Vermont's major modification is to limit the defense to
instances where there is no actual or constructive notice of the
patent.78 Actual notice entails the infringer seeing the invention
before developing the infringing technology.79 Constructive notice is
satisfied by the publication of an enabling disclosure of the
invention.8" With the availability of constructive notice, a truly
independent inventor who never sees the invention may still be
denied the defense because of constructive notice. Vermont argues
that such a defense reduces certain "system costs" while not
detrimentally lowering the patent system's incentive to invent. 8'
Finally, Carl Shapiro has offered a sophisticated economic
justification for prior user rights (a variant on the independent
inventor defense).82
Not all analyses of an independent inventor defense are positive.
One of the authors of this Article, while not rejecting independent
invention out of hand, articulated some concerns with the defense.83
First, the number of significant inventions that have occurred in a
multiple, independent inventor setting means that an independent
75. Id.
76. Id. at 544.
77. Vermont, supra note 72, at 484-89 (detailing the contours of a such a defense).
Cecil Quillen advocates an independent-inventor defense as well, although in a different
form. See Cecil D. Quillen, Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. & Bus. REV.
207, 235 (2006) (proposing "an affirmative 'prior-independent-inventor' noninfringement
defense that there is no infringement if the accused article or process (or the feature that
causes it to be accused) was actually reduced to practice by the alleged infringer prior to
the effective filing date of the asserted patent").
78. Vermont, supra note 72, at 485-87.
79. Id. at 485-86.
80. Id. at 486-87.
81. Id. at 493-500. The system costs saved include monopoly losses, rent dissipation,
and other miscellaneous costs such as patent prosecution and litigation costs. Id. at 490-
93.
82. Carl Shapiro, Patent Reform: Aligning Reward and Contribution 25-29 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13141, 2007), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3141.pdf.
83. Lemley, supra note 4, at 1525.
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invention defense would be a radical change in the patent system s4
Our data in this paper strengthens that conclusion. Second, there is a
risk that the availability of the defense will reduce the incentive to
invest in important technologies. This is particularly true if the
barrier to invention is cost, not the uncertainty of the results.85 In
addition, for certain industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry,
"patent owners may need the power associated with a right of
complete exclusion not just to encourage invention but to ensure that
the inventor invests the resources to take the idea from invention
through development to marketability.
86
An independent invention defense would focus the patent system
on copying to some extent-absolutely in the case of a pure
independent invention defense, and to a lesser extent if Vermont's
hybrid proposal were adopted. 87
Patent law, in short, does not require proof of copying. But
much of the thinking about the patent system by courts,
commentators, and the public is built on the assumption that
defendants are in fact copying inventions from patent owners. In Part
II, we put that assumption to the test.
II. THE SCARCITY OF COPIERS IN PATENT CASES
Because copying is not an element of patent cases, there is no
specific requirement that plaintiffs plead or prove that the defendant
has copied the invention, either from the patent itself or from the
plaintiff's commercial embodiment of the invention. Nonetheless,
there is good reason to believe that plaintiffs will have strong
incentives to plead and prove copying in cases where it exists. First,
the fact that the defendant copied an invention from the plaintiff
strongly suggests that the defendant's product infringes the patent;
while parties can and do fight about the meaning of patent claims, if
the defendant actually derived its product from the plaintiff's, it is
likely to fit within any reasonable interpretation of most patent
claims. Second, if the defendant copied from the plaintiff, that fact is
likely to provide strong evidence that the defendant was a willful as
84. Id. at 1528 (citing such examples of simultaneous invention as the steamboat,
airplane, and laser).
85. Id. at 1529.
86. Id. at 1530-31.
87. See Samson Vermont, The Angel is in the Big Picture: A Response to Lemley, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1537,1544 (2007).
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opposed to an innocent infringer, and therefore to justify an award of
enhanced damages for infringement. The correspondence is not
exact: a defendant may legitimately copy from the plaintiff if he has
good reason to believe the patent is invalid-what the Federal Circuit
has recently referred to as an objectively reasonable position.88 But
copying by the defendant is certainly evidence of willfulness that
patent owners will want to submit where available. Third, as we
noted in Part I, there are specific advantages patent owners can get by
proving copying, such as using that fact as evidence of
nonobviousness. Finally, plaintiffs who face the prospect of a jury
trial (as the overwhelming majority do)89 naturally want a good story
to tell, and the story of theft is much more attractive than the story of
inadvertent infringement.
To evaluate whether plaintiffs made claims of copying in patent
cases, we studied complaints for patent infringement. To determine
how those allegations fared, we studied written decisions that involve
copying. The combined data give us a useful window into the extent
of copying in patent litigation.
A. Allegations of Copying
1. Data Collection
To measure allegations of copying, we collected a sample of 200
patent infringement complaints filed between January 1, 2000 and
May 1, 2007, 100 each from two districts, the District of Delaware and
the Eastern District of Texas. Those districts have significantly
different characteristics-Delaware is the corporate headquarters of a
plurality of large companies and the base of operation of major
chemical and pharmaceutical enterprises, while eastern Texas is
mostly rural and has very little innovation, but has recently become
the district with the most patent cases because of its plaintiff-friendly
88. See In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
For discussion of the standard for willfulness and its problems, see, for example, Mark A.
Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1085, 1099-108 (2003). Doug Lichtman is the primary proponent of the
objective standard the court adopted. See id. at 1115-16 (discussing Lichtman's proposal).
89. By 1995, 70% of patent cases were tried to a jury. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1994 REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR, tbl.C-4, at A-37 (1994); Paul R. Michel, A View from the Bench: Achieving
Eficiency and Consistency, 19 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 41, 42 (2000).
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reputation. 9° Of those 200 cases, we excluded seven, four because the
PACER data files were corrupted or unavailable, two because they in
fact involved only trade secret claims or attempts to file suit on a not-
yet-issued patent, and one that involved a design patent. As a result,
our data set includes 193 useable cases. 91
For each of those 193 cases, we collected the initial complaint (if
it was filed within our timeframe) as well as any amended complaints.
We focused on amended complaints because it is possible that
plaintiffs did not have evidence of copying when they filed their
lawsuit, but later acquired such evidence; if so, it is reasonable to
expect that some (if not all) of them would include that evidence in
amended complaints. Our data set includes 179 initial complaints, 69
first amended complaints, 21 second amended complaints, and 8 third
or more amended complaints.
2. Data on Allegations of Willfulness
Of the 193 cases, plaintiffs alleged willfulness in the
overwhelming majority: 157, or 81.3%.92 This is roughly consistent
90. These data are from the Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse ("IPLC")
Website, http://Iexmachina.stanford.edu (registration and login required). Because of the
liberal patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006), patent plaintiffs can usually choose
any district in the country to file suit. As a result, the location of plaintiffs or defendants in
the district is less important than it is in other types of litigation. We selected these two
districts because they are two of the top five districts for patent litigation and because the
IPLC had data for those districts available at an early stage in its collection process. Once
the IPLC was fully populated, we examined a random sample of cases from other districts
to check the validity of our results. The outcome of this additional sample is reported
infra where relevant. See infra notes 92, 98-99, 103.
91. We use this sample as a tool to describe the approximate characteristics of the
larger population of patent complaints. Since we use only a sample of complaints, we
cannot predict with perfect accuracy the characteristics of the population as a whole.
Accordingly, we determined the "confidence intervals"-the range within which we can be
95% or 99% confident the actual number will fall-for all of the coding done.
While all of the confidence intervals are available upon request, we report the
confidence intervals in this Article that are important to the conclusions we identify,
identifying the interval as the upper and lower bound percentages around the observed
sample percentage (defined as p).
92. The confidence interval for the percentage of complaints alleging willfulness is
86.85% > p > 75.85%.
We also looked for allegations of willfulness in another, independent sample of
district court complaints filed in districts other than the Eastern District of Texas and the
District of Delaware. Out of 102 complaints sampled, 72 were readable and included a
claim of utility patent infringement. Out of these 72 complaints, 51 (70.83%) contained an
allegation of willful infringement. The confidence interval for the percentage of
1442 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87
with Kimberly Moore's finding that willfulness was alleged in over
90% of cases.93 While one might think this is evidence that at least
plaintiffs believed copying was widespread, we cannot draw that
conclusion because the legal definition of willfulness at the time these
complaints were filed did not require proof of copying or even
advance knowledge of the existence of the patent or the patent
owner.94 It was sufficient to show that the defendant didn't stop
infringing once it found out about the patent and didn't have good
reason to believe that the patent was invalid or not infringed.
In fact, there is good reason to believe that the allegations of
willfulness do not in fact reflect evidence of widespread copying. Of
the 193 cases, only 60 (or 31.1%) involved allegations that the
defendant was even aware of the patent before the lawsuit. It is
common for patent plaintiffs to send a letter putting the defendant on
notice of the existence of the patent; if the plaintiff did in fact send
such a letter, we would expect the plaintiff to allege it, because in
most cases patent damages begin to accrue only once the defendant
receives such notice.95 The fact that nearly 70% of plaintiffs don't
complaints alleging willfulness is 59.41% >p >80.59%. This result confirms the findings
of willfulness allegations in our first complaint sample.
93. See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14
FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 232 (2004). Judge Moore found that 92% of the complaints in cases
that terminated in 1999 or 2000 alleged willfulness. Id. It is not clear what explains the
discrepancy between her findings and ours; our data set is substantially more recent
(involving cases filed after 2000, when her cases terminated), so it is possible that
allegations of willfulness have been declining over time. But sampling error or district-
specific effects may explain part of the discrepancy as well.
94. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 88, at 1116-18. The Federal Circuit changed the
standard in the last half of 2007, after these complaints were filed. In re Seagate Tech.
LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (overruling the negligence
standard for willful infringement set forth in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983) in favor of an "objective
recklessness" standard). But the new standard-"objective recklessness"-still does not
require that the defendant copied the invention from the plaintiff; a weak argument
coupled with a failure to make adequate investigation can still make even an independent
developer a willful infringer. Id. at 1371.
95. If the patentee makes physical products and marks them, that marking may
constitute constructive notice of infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). If they do not
mark their products, patentees can recover damages only for sales that occurred after the
patentee gave notice of the patent to the defendant. If there is no marking and no notice,
damages are not available except for sales made after the suit is filed. Id. Thus, there is
substantial incentive to give notice of infringement in those situations. For discussion of
the marking and notice requirements, see Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict
Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 829-45 (2002).
But marking does not apply to process patents or to those who don't sell products. Cf
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even allege that the defendant was on notice of the patent at the time
the lawsuit was filed suggests that the plaintiffs did not have evidence
that the defendants in those cases had copied the patent.96 Further, of
the 98 amended complaints in our database, only 3 were amended to
add allegations of willfulness, providing at least some inferential
evidence that most claims of willfulness don't involve actual
knowledge of the defendant's intent. Were it otherwise, we would
expect to see willfulness pled later in the case rather than at the
outset, after discovery into defendant's intent. That doesn't appear to
happen.
3. Data on Allegations of Copying
When we investigated allegations that might correspond to actual
copying, the results were even more dramatic. Barely 10% (21 of 193,
or 10.9%) of the complaints we studied alleged that the defendant
had copied the invention, either from the patent or from the
plaintiff's commercial product.9 And we might think of this in some
respects as an upper bound, because these include bare allegations
that the defendant copied the invention. For example, we included in
this category an allegation that the defendant has "built their system
on use of [plaintiff's] patents" and an allegation that defendant's
product is "a substantial copy" of plaintiff's, both of which might be
JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 410 (2d ed. 2006) ("The
§ 287(a) marking statute does not apply to patents that claim only processes or methods
..... "). For criticism of the rule as applied to online methods, see generally Tim Hsieh,
The Adequacy of the Mark: Raising the Standard Under 35 U.S. C. § 287(a) for Patented
Online Software Methods, 48 IDEA 69 (2007).
96. That doesn't mean the defendants in those cases didn't actually copy, of course;
just that the plaintiff had no basis on which to allege that they did, even as of the date of
filing of the amended complaints.
97. The confidence interval for the percentage of complaints alleging copying is
15.27% > p > 6.49%. In our second sample of complaints, see supra note 92, twelve of the
seventy-two complaints (16.67%) contained an allegation of copying. The confidence
interval for the percentage of complaints in this second sample alleging copying is
24.47% > p > 7.53%. While the observed percentage of copying in the second sample falls
outside the confidence interval of our initial sample, the two confidence intervals for the
samples do overlap substantially. In addition, the percentage of allegations of copying in
this second sample is still quite small, further substantiating our observations in this
Article. The results of the second sample suggest that the actual percentage of complaints
alleging copying may be higher than 10.9%, but not much higher.
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general uses of the term "copy" or "use" to refer to similarity rather
than derivation.9"
Using this data, we can look at how related allegations of
willfulness are to allegations of copying. In the 157 complaints
alleging willfulness, 18 of those complaints also alleged copying
(11.46%). Likewise, of the remaining 36 complaints not containing a
willfulness allegation, 3 included an allegation of copying (8.33%).
These two percentages are fairly similar, suggesting that there is no
significant relationship between allegations of copying and allegations
of willfulness. The result of a Fisher's Exact Test on the data
confirms this finding, returning a p-value of 0.7077. 99
Even more significant is the fact that 13 of the 21 cases alleging
copying are pharmaceutical patents filed against generic ANDA
filers. Because of the mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic
pharmaceutical defendants necessarily must copy the plaintiff's active
ingredient to achieve bioequivalence. 1°
The prevalence of ANDA cases in the small subset of cases that
allege copying also points to another fact: whether patent plaintiffs
allege copying depends on particular industries. In Table 1, we report
98. This demonstrates how broad a definition of an "allegation of copying" we used in
our study-both when looking at complaints and opinions. Essentially, an allegation of
any use of the patent or a commercial embodiment of the patented technology in the
development of the allegedly infringing product or process was considered an allegation of
copying, even though many such uses would not in fact be "copying" by most definitions.
To be sure, there may be situations in which a defendant does not copy the plaintiff's
invention or even see it but nonetheless is indirectly influenced by it. If a defendant is
aware that the plaintiff has succeeded in making the invention, for instance, but doesn't
know how, the mere knowledge that it can be done might itself be an aid to the defendant
in developing its own product. We don't class this as copying, though some might find it to
be a "use" of the plaintiff's invention in some sense.
99. This is the two-tail p-value. For the distribution to be statistically significant, a p-
value must be less than 0.05. See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 484 (3d ed.
1998). A p-value less than 0.01 is considered highly statistically significant. Id.
We selected the Fisher's Exact Test over the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test to
measure statistical significance because of the small population size and the limited
number of positives in the results being compared here. See B.S. EVERITT, THE
ANALYSIS OF CONTINGENCY TABLES 7, 15-16 (2d ed. 1992); GEORGE W. SNEDECOR &
WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 126-27 (8th ed. 1989) (explaining that
the Fisher's Exact Test is favored over the Chi-Squared Test for smaller expected
frequencies).
100. This proportion varies slightly in our second random sample. See supra note 97.
Of the twelve instances of copying in this second sample, three are based on ANDA
filings. That may reflect a smaller overall percentage of pharmaceutical cases in the
second random sample, which excluded cases from Delaware, where many pharmaceutical
patent cases are filed.
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not only the overall data on copying but also the industry-specific
data. 1'
Table 1: Complaint Data By Industry
Aetua PrimChange
Number ' Ep i





Industry Cases Alleged e ligs Alleged-
! : tos?
Pharmaceutical 20 17 12 13'02  0 0 1 0
Medical 8 6 2 0 1 1 1 0
Biotechnology 10 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
Computer- 76 62 21 2 4 0 0 2
related
Software 67 54 21 2 2 0 0 1
Semiconductor 11 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
Electronics 31 27 9 2 3 2 1 0
Chemistry 25 22 16 14 1 1 1 0
Mechanics 38 30 12 3 2 1 0 0
Acoustics 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
Optics 14 12 2 0 1 1 0 0
Automotive 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 0
Energy 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Communication 31 23 12 1 0 0 0 2
TOTALS 193 157 60 21 10 5 2 2
As noted above, 10.9% of the overall cases allege copying. But
the percentage of cases that allege copying by industry range from a
low of 0% in optics and in semiconductors to a high of 65% in
pharmaceuticals. 0 3 It is also worth noting that the two largest classes
101. We use the fourteen industry categories created and defined in John R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution,
53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2110-12 (2000). Note that patents can and frequently do fit into
more than one industry category, which is why the industry totals exceed the total number
of patents.
102. Thirteen of sixteen ANDA cases involved allegations of copying; three other
ANDA cases presumably involved copying but did not specifically allege it.
103. To avoid meaningless results, we report in text only the results for those industries
with more than ten cases in our sample.
While the chemistry industry also produces a high result, 56% copying, that result
is driven by the fact that most of the pharmaceutical cases are also chemistry cases. If we
exclude pharmaceutical cases, there are only nine chemistry cases in the data set and only
one (11%) alleges copying.
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in our sample, computer-related inventions and software, have
extremely low levels of alleged copying (2.6% and 3.0%,
respectively)." From this data, we observe a highly statistically
significant difference between allegations of copying in
pharmaceutical cases and similar allegations in computer-related and
software cases. 1°5 Allegations of copying are more likely in the
chemical than in the IT industries.
To try further to parse these allegations of copying, we reviewed
the complaints to determine what particular facts were alleged that
might support an inference of copying. We found that 10 of the 193
complaints, or 5.2%, involved allegations of a prior business
relationship between the firms, something that might plausibly have
led to copying. Only 5 of the 193 complaints, or 2.6%, include an
allegation of misappropriation of trade secrets, which necessarily
requires an allegation of copying. And only 2 cases involve
allegations of infringement by departing employees. 10 6 None of these
taken alone is particularly strong evidence; it is certainly possible that
a defendant copied the plaintiff's invention in the marketplace or
read the patent and used it to design its product, though the latter in
particular would seem an odd business decision. And trade secret
claims exist in some tension with patent claims, since one requires
secrecy and the other requires disclosure.107 However, these data
The confidence interval for the percentage of pharmaceutical complaints alleging
copying is 85.9% > p > 44.1%. The confidence interval for the percentage of chemical
complaints alleging copying is 75.46% > p > 36.54%.
104. The confidence interval for the percentage of computer-related complaints
alleging copying is 6.23% > p > 0%. The confidence interval for the percentage of
software complaints alleging copying is 7.07% > p > 0%.
105. A Fisher's Exact Test gives a p-value < 0.0001. Since these industries commonly
appear in pairs for a given invention-with pharmaceutical and chemical appearing
together and computer-related and software appearing together-the observations of
alleged copying were similarly paired and placed in a 2x2 table when performing the
Fisher's Exact Test.
A similar result is observed in our second random sample of complaints. See
supra notes 92 and 97. Of the twelve complaints containing an allegation of copying, four
allegations were in pharmaceutical and/or chemical cases while no allegations were in
computer-related or software cases.
106. These numbers can't merely be added together; the two departing employee cases,
for example, are also two of the cases that involve trade secret claims.
107. See Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 921 (7th Cir.
1953) (requiring election between patenting and secrecy). For complications of this
general rule, compare Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Typically, the publication of a patent terminates all trade secret
rights."), with Evans Cooling Sys. v. General Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
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points reinforce the idea that not merely express allegations of
copying, but allegations of facts that might involve copying, are
surprisingly rare.
Finally, it is quite possible that even where defendants are
engaged in copying, the plaintiffs may not know of that copying at the
time they file their complaints. To try to assess this, we evaluated
changes in allegations to see whether amended complaints added
allegations of willfulness or copying. Only two amended complaints
added allegations of copying, and only three added allegations of
willfulness. While it is of course possible that plaintiffs discovered
evidence of copying too late to amend the complaint, or discovered it
but decided not to amend the complaint, for the reasons we suggested
above we think plaintiffs who were already amending their
complaints would likely have been motivated to add those allegations
if possible."8
Patent infringement, like most causes of action in the federal
system, is governed by the relatively lax rules of notice pleading.0 9
As a result, it is possible that plaintiffs simply do not include
allegations either of copying or of the facts that might give rise to
copying, opting instead for a simple complaint that merely identifies
the patent and the defendant's product. As noted above, we think
there are substantial reasons to allege copying when the plaintiff has
evidence of it.
Nonetheless, we acknowledge that the data in this Section may
undercount the number of cases in which plaintiffs believe defendants
have copied their invention, because some of those plaintiffs may
simply not have mentioned that fact in their complaints.
To guard against this possibility, we collected 102 actual reported
decisions that litigate issues involving evidence of copying. " ' For
each of those decisions, we then collected the associated complaints
from IPLC and ran the same analysis we ran on the randomly
1997) (invalidating a patent based on public use by an alleged thief, the court reasoned
that the patentee could have filed a trade secret claim).
108. There is also the possibility that a defendant did in fact copy, but evidence of
copying was never discovered. However, such a situation is highly unlikely given the
incentive to label the infringer a "copier" and the broad scope of discovery under the
federal rules. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 8.
110. There were 107 cases collected, but in two cases the files were corrupted, and in
three cases the complaints were unavailable. We discuss the results of those decisions in
Part II.B infra.
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selected complaints. This should provide a useful check on the
problem of underpleading; if copying is not alleged in these
complaints, which ultimately involve litigation of copying issues, it
would suggest that our approach might be missing some substantial
evidence of copying.
We report the aggregate results in Table 2.
Table 2: Copying Allegations in Complaints Where Copying Is
Ultimately Litigated
Total Cases 102
Willfulness Alleged 68 (66.7%)
Actual Notice Prior to Threat 44 (43.1%)
Copying Alleged 96 (94.1%)
Prior Business Dealings 9 (8.8%)
Trade Secrets 4 (3.9%)
Departing Employees 1 (1.0%)
Changes in Allegations 6 (5.9%)
These results confirm that, for allegations of copying, complaints
are nearly as good a metric as written opinions. Of those cases where
allegations of copying appeared in an opinion, almost all of the
complaints also included such allegations-94.1% to be exact.' This
means that in only 5.9% of the cases did an allegation of copying
appear in a district court opinion but not in the corresponding
complaint for the case. There is, therefore, good reason to believe
that if a patent case involves questions of copying that are mentioned
in a decision, these allegations also appear in the complaint.
To make sure this cross-check is not skewed by the certainty of
copying in ANDA cases pursuit to our coding methodology, we
backed ANDA cases out of the analysis. The percentage changes
slightly, but not much, when ANDA cases are removed. Of the 102
cases where the complaints were examined, 55 were ANDA cases-
which are coded as cases alleging copying. Of the remaining 47 cases,
41 included allegations of copying both in the complaint and the
written opinion-87.23%. 12
111. It is worth noting that a Fisher's Exact Test looking at the difference between
allegations of copying appearing in the complaint dataset compared to the opinion dataset
produces a two-tailed p-value of 0.0290.
112. Fisher's Exact Test produces a two-tailed p-value of 0.0264.
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B. Court Findings of Copying
To get further evidence of copying in patent cases, we turn from
complaints to decided cases.
1. Data Collection
In order to measure actual findings of copying in patent cases, we
looked at district court opinions available on WESTLAW.'13 We
collected an initial set of opinions that included all opinions in cases
involving an allegation of patent infringement issued on January 1,
2006 to February 29, 2008.4 We then searched the resulting set of
opinions to identify situations where there were multiple opinions
issued during the defined time period for a single case. Multiple
opinions for a single case were collapsed to one "case" entry.115 As a
result, we had a final dataset that included 1,871 patent infringement
cases in which opinions were published on WESTLAW during a 26-
month period.'
16
113. The search was done on WESTLAW's U.S. District Courts Cases ("DCT")
database. The DCT database "has all available federal district court cases with coverage
beginning in 1945." See WESTLAW Scope for the DCT database. "All available" is
misleading-the database includes all those opinions that WESTLAW wishes to make
electronically available. This includes all opinions found in the Federal Supplement series
published by WESTLAW and other opinions that WESTLAW chooses to publish.
114. The specific search to capture this set of data was "PATENT /3 INFRING! &
da(aft 12/31/2005 & bef 3/1/2008)." The results from this search were then reviewed to
remove those opinions that did not involve actual allegations of patent infringement.
We treated as involving allegations of patent infringement both claims of patent
infringement appearing in the complaint and counterclaims of the same. An opinion was
deemed to contain an allegation of patent infringement even if the patent infringement
claim had been dismissed or adjudicated prior to the opinion's issuance. Claims of
infringement based solely on design or plant patents were not considered "patent
infringement cases" for the purposes of this study.
115. Weighting by cases rather than opinions makes sense so as to not overweight
those cases where there are multiple opinions.
116. In comparison to the sampling study used to examine complaints, we used a
population study when looking at opinions. As one author has previously noted, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to generate a random, representative sample using reported
cases. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 194 n.20 (1998) ("[W]hen using reported cases as
data sources, there are intractable problems with treating the grouping of cases as a
representative random sample, regardless of how carefully one has defined the grouping.
Although it is self-evident that any grouping of cases represents a subset of something
larger, i.e., a population of something, it is practically impossible to assure that the
grouping is a representative sample, much less a random one.").
A population study can both be used to generate descriptive data and
predictions-the predictions coming from "treating the population as a subset of a
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We then coded the patent infringement opinions for these cases
in the following three ways. First, we identified opinions mentioning
allegations of copying.'17 We used the same liberal approach for
identifying allegations of copying as we did when coding
complaints.' 18  We further investigated opinions that included
allegations of copying to determine whether copying was actually
proven."9  A finding of copying for the purposes of this study
included only those findings that the patented invention was copied. 20
'superpopulation'-in this case the hypothetical population of all past and future ...
decisions-without pretense that the data set is a representative sample of that
superpopulation." Id. (citing M.E. Thompson, Superpopulation Models, in 9
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STAT. SCI. 93 (1988)).
Accordingly, with a population study, there is no need to generate confidence
intervals for the results. But, just to be sure, we undertook a similar analysis as Christian
Chu in his empirical patent claim construction article. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1075, 1094-95 (2001). In order to get a 95% confidence level with a margin of error at 5%
for determinations of whether the population includes instances of allegations of copying
or findings of copying, we would need a sample size, N, of at least 384. See id.; SUSAN F.
WAGNER, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS 201-02 (1992) (defining N=(Za,)2(PQ)[B 2,
where Z. is the z-score for the confidence interval, P is the sample proportion, Q is (1-P),
and B stands for the margin of error). The population includes 1,871 cases, well above the
N we would need to reach a 95% confidence level.
117. We did this in a two-step process. We began with a keyword search. For example,
the dataset was searched for the presence of the words "copying," "copied," "copy,"
"duplicat!," "imitat!," "counterfeit!," "forger," "steal," and "stole!" within the same
paragraph as the word "patent." Then the results of that search, and others, were
examined by hand to gain a full understanding of whether the copying of the patented
technology, if any, was alleged. In the end, while the initial searches were quite broad as
to what trigger words would find discussion of copying, the word itself-"copy" and its
derivatives-found almost all copying discussions in the dataset. This is not to say that
other copying-related words did not also appear in the same opinion, merely that adding
those words did not bring in many additional cases.
118. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (describing the definition of "allegation
of copying" used in this study).
What makes this approach even more likely to overcount instances of copying is
the possibility that judges are using terms such as "copying" rhetorically, as opposed to
literally. See supra Part I.B.3.
119. A finding of copying took many forms, from the result of a bench trial to an
admission by the defendant. See, e.g., Erico Int'l Corp. v. Doc's Mktg., Inc., No.
1:05cv2924, 2006 WL 1174259, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 2006) ("Here, Defendant openly
has admitted that it engaged in direct copying of the Plaintiff's patented products."). In an
ANDA case, copying was considered "found" if infringement was found.
120. By contrast, an opinion that found copying of non-patented aspects of the
plaintiff's technology, while coded as an allegation of copying, was not coded as a finding
of copying for the purposes of this study. See, e.g., Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., No. C
98-20451 JF, 2006 WL 3302476, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2006) (noting that copying of a
non-claimed feature was irrelevant to the question of willful infringement). Our definition
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Second, we made a separate pass through the dataset of patent
infringement cases to identify cases that involved allegations of willful
infringement. 121  For those cases containing allegations of willful
infringement, we determined whether the allegation was decided, and
if so, whether willful infringement was found or not.122 We also coded
the willfulness cases by industry.
123
Third, we conducted a final search of the patent infringement
dataset to identify all opinions mentioning allegations of infringement
based on filings of an ANDA-that is infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A). 24
2. Data on Claims of Copying
Out of the 1,871 patent infringement opinions in the dataset, 129
of them (6.89%) included an allegation of copying that was
mentioned in an opinion. Of these 129 cases, the allegation of
copying was based on the filing of an ANDA in a little over half of
the cases-78 (60.47%) of the cases.1 25 Copying was actually found in
33 cases (25.58%), with the finding occurring in 22 of the ANDA
cases and 11 of the non-ANDA cases. When placed in the context of
all of the patent infringement cases in the study, copying was
established in only 1.76% of all cases in the dataset.
A couple of observations can be made. First, the percentage of
cases where copying was alleged dropped from 10.9% when we
looked at the complaints to 6.89% when we looked at opinions.
of proven copying narrowed in that a finding of copying did not include findings that an
alleged infringer successfully designed-around a patent claim or copied an element that
was not covered by the asserted patent claims.
121. We did this in two steps, just as with our coding of copying. We searched
WESTLAW to identify discussions of willful infringement. For example, the dataset was
searched for the presence of any derivative of the string "willful" within three words of the
string "infring!." Then, the results of that search, and others, were examined by hand to
gain a full understanding of the willful infringement, if any, that was actually alleged.
122. For example, an allegation of willfulness was deemed "decided" if the opinion
reported a jury verdict, bench trial determination, ruling on a judgment as a matter of law,
or decision on summary judgment.
123. The same categories used in the early part of this Article were used here. See
supra note 101 and accompanying text.
124. Again, this was done by searching WESTLAW-for example searching for the
strings "ANDA" or "abbreviated new drug application"-and then processing those
results by hand.
125. All ANDA cases were coded as cases alleging copying due to the nature of the
§ 271(e)(2)(A) claim. However, it is worth repeating, the copying necessary for filing an
ANDA may not be copying of the patented technology.
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Looking at the descriptive data, there appears to be a higher
likelihood that an allegation of copying will appear in a complaint as
opposed to a written decision.126 The most obvious explanation for
this discrepancy is that allegations are just that-allegations-and not
all will be proven in court. The difference may also reflect the fact
that a district court has little reason, in many cases, to mention
copying in a written opinion. For example, some decisions that
involve claims of copying may not need to resolve the copying issue
and therefore may not discuss it. It is also worth noting that the
6.89% finding of allegations of copying in court decisions falls within
the confidence interval (margin of error) of the percentage of
complaints that include copying allegations.
127
Second, the fact that a little over half of the copying allegations
and two-thirds of the findings of copying occurred in ANDA cases is
explained by the nature of the ANDA patent litigation. This falls in
line with the data from complaints, with around 60% of cases alleging
copying both in complaints and opinions being ANDA cases. As
previously explained, ANDA cases inherently involve copying of the
patentee's product by the alleged infringer, and in most such cases the
copying is of the patented technology.128 And when infringement is
found, that infringement generally means that the patented invention
was copied in the ANDA.
Finally, and most noteworthy, is the very small number of cases
where copying was actually found. Such findings make up just over
1% of the cases included in this part of our study. And if the ANDA
cases are removed because of their unique linkage to copying,
findings of copying drop to less than half a percent.
However, while the percentage of actual findings of copying may
be low, there is also a real possibility of underreporting. Even if
patentees want to argue copying, there is typically no reason for a
court to mention copying in a patent infringement opinion because
copying is irrelevant to the core issue in these cases-liability. In fact,
126. We performed a Pearson's Chi-Squared Test for statistical significance. See
generally MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 157-62
(2d ed. 2001) (describing the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test). The data set was too large for
a Fisher's Exact Test. A Pearson's Chi-Squared Test produces a p-value of 0.04238, which
means that the difference is statistically significant, but just barely.
127. See supra note 97 (noting that the confidence interval for the complaint incidents
of alleged copying is 15.27% > p > 6.49%).
128. In other cases the patent may cover an inactive ingredient or a dissolution profile.
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the Federal Circuit has admonished courts that discuss copying in the
context of patent infringement.129
3. Data on Willful Infringement Findings
An alternative way to determine the amount of copying that
actually takes place in patent infringement cases is to focus on those
patent infringement cases where copying is explicitly relevant to the
opinion being written. In opinions discussing patent issues where
copying is relevant-in willfulness, inducement, or nonobviousness
decisions for example-a court is more likely to be presented with
evidence of copying and, in turn, more likely to mention and decide
the question of copying the patent.13 The law makes copying
relevant in these contexts, and therefore a litigant's push to make
copying an issue is more likely to be reflected in a written opinion
(and it is extremely likely that plaintiffs who can allege or argue
copying will do so). At the same time, just considering these cases
would overstate the amount of copying, since copying is by definition
far more likely to be raised in successful patent cases that involve
willfulness allegations than in the litigation population at large.
As a result, we focused on cases involving allegations of willful
infringement in order to estimate an upper bound on allegations and
proof of copying in patent cases. In the dataset, there were 226 cases
(12.08%) where an allegation of willful infringement was
mentioned."' An allegation of copying was mentioned or implied in
40 (17.70%) of these cases.132 A decision on willfulness was reported
129. See Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
cf. Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc. v. Epilogics Group, No. 03-CV-70181-DT, 2008 WL 183546,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2008) (labeling the patentee's argument that copying is relevant
to the question of liability as "disingenuous").
130. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int'l v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312 2008 WL 63233, at *2
(N.D. Il1. Jan. 3, 2008) ("[P]re-patent conduct is relevant to a determination of willfulness
... when that pre-patent conduct consists of egregious copying (citing cases).").
131. The difference between this result and that observed with allegations of
willfulness in complaints is highly statistically significant, with a Pearson's Chi-Square test
producing a p-value < 0.0001. That is, it is significantly more likely that a complaint will
contain an allegation of willfulness than an opinion. This observation is explained by the
fact that a district court has no reason to mention an allegation of willful infringement
unless the allegation is being decided. And the issue of willfulness is not addressed until
most of the other issues in a given case are resolved in the patentee's favor. Therefore, in
the opinion data, there is likely significant underreporting of willfulness allegations.
132. As before, patent infringement claims based on the filing of ANDAs are treated
as allegations of copying the patented technology.
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in 77 (34.07%) of the 226 total cases. The split in results on
willfulness was roughly 50-50-with willful infringement being found
in 42 cases (54.55%) and not found in 35 cases (45.45%). Copying
was alleged in 20 (25.97%) and found in 8 (10.39%) of the 77 cases
deciding willfulness. A finding of copying resulted in a finding of
willful infringement in 7 out of 8 cases (87.5%) where willfulness was
actually decided. The remaining case finding copying had yet to
decide the willfulness issue.
1 33
Mentions of copying, both allegations and actual findings, were
more prevalent in willfulness decisions (17.70%) than in the
published decisions more generally (6.89%). And this difference is
highly statistically significant. 134  This is not surprising given that
copying is relevant to such an inquiry, but this result does differ from
our complaint results, where there was no significant relationship
between allegations of willfulness and allegations of copying.
13 5
But even here, the existence of copying allegations in published
decisions did not rise dramatically, moving from 6.89% in the context
of all of the cases to 17.70% in the context of only willfulness cases.
The amount of copying found also did not jump significantly, rising
from 1.76% in the context of all cases to 4.87% in the context of cases
mentioning an allegation of willfulness. This view of the dataset may
give us a better understanding of the amount of copying actually
occurring in patent infringement cases given that courts have a reason
to mention and decide the issue. The low percentages, however, still
tell the same story as our earlier analysis-surprisingly little copying
has occurred in these litigated cases.
It is also worth noting that when a court decides the willfulness
issue and also finds copying, the court almost always deems the
infringement willful. This data suggests that actual copying is good
evidence of willful infringement. The one case in which copying did
not support a finding of willfulness was an ANDA case. 3 6 This is not
133. For example, in one case, copying was admitted, but the court had yet to decide
the issue of willfulness. See Erico Int'l Corp. v. Doc's Mktg., Inc., No. 1:05cv2924, 2006
WL 1174259, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 2006).
134. The existence of copying allegations in willfulness cases is highly statistically
significant, with a Pearson's Chi-Square test producing a p-value < 0.0001.
135. The difference in statistical results between complaints and opinions is likely a
continuation of the higher incident of willfulness allegations in complaints as compared to
opinions. See supra note 131.
136. See Janssen, L.P. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 07-1515 (JAP), 2008 WL 323558, at *3
(D. N.J. Feb. 4, 2008).
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surprising, given that there is Federal Circuit case law holding that the
action of filing an ANDA, by itself, is not evidence of willful
infringement.'37 District courts have repeatedly found no willful
infringement even in light of the copying that accompanies an
ANDA.38  The fact that-at least outside of ANDA cases-
successful proof of copying overwhelmingly leads to a finding of
willfulness bolsters our assumption that patentees have a strong
incentive to allege and prove copying where they can.
The cases alleging willfulness can also be broken down by
industry. Table 3 below depicts the industries involved in cases
alleging willfulness. Specifically, Table 3 provides the number of
cases for a given industry that involved allegations of copying and
then actual findings of copying. 139 For a given industry, percentages
are provided that indicate the percentage of cases where willfulness
was alleged, willfulness was found, copying was alleged, and copying
was found.
137. See Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2000) ("An ANDA filing by its very nature is a 'highly artificial act of
infringement,' therefore, the trial court need not have elevated the ANDA certification
into a finding of willful infringement.") (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496
U.S. 661, 678 (1990)).
138. See, e.g., Janssen, L.P., 2008 WL 323558, at *3 n.1 (citing eight district court
opinions where an allegation of willful infringement was dismissed because it was based
solely on the act of filing the ANDA).
139. The numbers are bigger than the total number of cases observed because of the
fact that the invention in one case can involve multiple industries.
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Table 3: Copying by Industry in Cases Including Willfulness
Allegations
Indstfr Willfulns iluln ess Copying Copying
c Alleed Found ______ Found
Pharmaceutical 15 0 (0%) 15 (100%) 3 (20%)
Medical Devices 23 3 (13.04%) 6 (26.08%) 2 (8.7%)
Biotechnology 15 4 (26.67%) 3 (20%) 0 (0%)
Computer-related 67 14 (20.90%) 4(5.97%) 1 (1.49%)
Software 46 9 (19.57%) 3 (6.52%) 1(2.17%)
Semiconductor 8 1(12.5%) 1 (12.5%) 0 (0%)
Electronics 24 5 (20.83%) 2 (8.33%) 0 (0%)
Chemistry 30 1(3.33%) 18 (60%) 3 (10%)
Mechanics 93 20 (21.51%) 13 (13.98%) 7 (7.53%)
Acoustics 1 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Optics 9 1 (11.11%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Automotive 8 2 (25%) 2 (25%) 1(12.5%)
Energy 5 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 0(0%)
Communications 9 3 (33.33%) 1 (11.11%) 1 (11.11%)
This data mimics the results from complaint data in most
respects. As with complaints, pharmaceutical and chemical cases
make up a large portion of those cases mentioning allegations of
copying and finding actual copying. On the other end of the spectrum
are computer-related and software cases, where there was a large
number of cases alleging willful infringement, but a small number of
allegations and findings of copying. As with our findings with respect
to complaints, there is a highly statistically significant difference
between allegations of copying in pharmaceutical and chemical cases
as compared to computer-related and software cases. 140  Again,
allegations are more likely to exist in pharmaceutical and chemical
cases.
C. Interpreting the Data
None of these measures is perfect. Data based on complaints are
in one sense likely to overstate the amount of copying, since it merely
140. A Pearson's Chi-Square test produced a p-value of 0.0002.
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requires that the plaintiff allege something even in general terms, not
that it be proven. On the other hand, that data may well understate
the amount of copying, because some plaintiffs may not include an
allegation of copying even if they believe it to have occurred, or may
find out about copying too late in the litigation to amend their
complaints. It is also possible that there is information flow that
doesn't rise to the level of copying but still represents some sort of
"free riding" on the patentee's product, 4' though the incentives of
plaintiffs to argue copying when they can should mean that most such
cases get included within the broad definition of copying that we use.
The specific fact situations we associate with copying are similarly
both under- and over-inclusive; not every case of a departing
employee or a business deal gone bad will involve copying, and not
every case of copying will involve one of those facts.
Data based on actual litigation of willfulness in written decisions
reflects a different set of biases; it solves the undercounting and
mistaken allegations problems with complaints, but it overcounts
bench as opposed to jury trials, since the former are more likely to
result in a written opinion, and it may be subject to selection bias if
obvious cases of copying are disproportionately likely to settle before
resolution. Finally, willfulness cases standing alone are likely to
significantly overstate the percentage of copying, because both the
fact that the plaintiff won the infringement suit and the fact that the
plaintiff has alleged willful infringement are likely to be correlated
with an artificially high level of copying.
If each of these measures produced significantly different results,
we might conclude that those results reflected imperfections in the
proxies we used for copying. But the fact that all these diverse
methodologies produce largely consistent results (as summarized in
Table 4) gives us substantial confidence that copying is indeed rare in
patent litigation.
141. We thank Ted Sichelman for this point.
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Table 4: Summary of Findings of Copying Across Measures
Measure Total Cases Copying Percentage
Complaints 193 21 10.9
(Pharma) 20 13 65.0
(Non-pharma) 173 8 4.2
Decisions
Allegations 1871 129 6.9
(Pharma) 78 78 100
(Non-pharma) 1793 51 2.8
Findings 1871 33 1.8
(Pharma) 78 22 28.2
(Non-pharma) 1793 11 0.6
Willfulness
Allegations 226 40 17.7
Findings 77 8 10.4
So does the fact that the cases that end up involving copying
almost all involved allegations of copying in the complaints. That
doesn't mean we have captured every instance of copying; doubtless
there are some we missed, perhaps because the plaintiffs themselves
missed them. But it does suggest that the numbers we report are,
while not perfect, pretty good approximations of the level of copying
in the real world.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DATA
A. Understanding Policy Debates and Reform Proposals
The rarity of copying in modern patent law has several
implications for understanding current rhetorical debates, public
policy discussions, and proposals for reform.
First, it should be evident that patent infringement can rarely, if
ever, be equated with "theft" of physical property or even "piracy" of
other types of IP. Public policy debates around patent reform often
involve claims that any weakening of the patent right will destroy the
patent system by encouraging widespread "theft" of patent rights.142
142. See, e.g., Edward M. Roche, Internet and Computer Related Crime: Economic and
Other Harms to Organizational Entities, 76 MiSS. L.J. 639, 644 (2007) (referring to the
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But our data suggest that there is very little "theft" of patent rights
going on right now-at least as it is represented in patent cases.
Virtually every case filed-and even the overwhelming majority of
those in which the plaintiffs win and claim that the defendant was a
willful infringer-involve not theft or even copying with a legitimate
effort to design around but independent development by the
defendant. That doesn't mean that those defendants are not
infringing, or that they shouldn't be held liable. Nor does it resolve
the underlying debates over patent reform; just because no one is
copying patented inventions now doesn't mean they wouldn't do so
under a different legal regime. But it is simply inaccurate to speak of
patent defendants as a whole as "unscrupulous copyists" or
"thieves." 143
The second implication for existing policy debates flows from the
exception to what we just said. There are a few industries in which
the defendants do in fact copy the invention from the plaintiffs-the
pharmaceutical and chemical industries. In those industries, the
majority of cases involve allegations of copying. Indeed, in the
pharmaceutical industry most patent infringement suits are filed
against generic companies that file an ANDA application with the
FDA in which they effectively admit that they have copied the
plaintiff's drug (though not necessarily the plaintiff's patent) in order
to show bioequivalence between the two products.
The contrast between the pharmaceutical industry and the rest of
the patent world, and particularly the information technology
industries, will be a familiar one to those who have been following the
years-long debate over patent reform. On issue after issue, the
biopharmaceutical and the IT industries have lined up on opposite
sides of the debate, effectively stifling legislative patent reform. Dan
Burk and Mark Lemley have argued that this split results from
"stealing of patents"); Christine Hlavka, Note, Contractor Patent Bandits: Preventing the
Government from Avoiding 28 U.S. C. § 1498 Liability for Its Contractors' Unauthorized
Use of Patented Material by Outsourcing One or More Steps of the Process Abroad, 37
PUB. CONT. L.J. 321, 322-29 (2008) (calling infringers "patent bandits"); Marian Uhlman,
Pushing Drug Patents, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 1993, at D1 (quoting patent owners
referring to "patent pirates," comparing them to termites, and analogizing infringement to
stealing a car).
143. But see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)
(implying otherwise).
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fundamentally different industry characteristics.'" Our data provides
a significant new piece of evidence to support that view. The IT
industries, which faced a majority of the lawsuits in our samples, were
virtually never accused of actually copying their products from the
patent owner. Their perspective on strong patent enforcement rules
will accordingly be quite different than that of companies in an
industry in which copying is the norm in infringement suits.
Finally, our data shed some light on the growing chorus of calls
for an independent development defense, which currently does not
exist in the United States.'45 A number of scholars have argued that
patent law should exempt independent development and instead
target only copying, just as copyright and trade secret law do. 146 One
of us has expressed some skepticism over that proposal. 47 Our data
demonstrates precisely how much is at stake in this debate. A patent
infringement system that punished only copying would look
dramatically different than current law. Ninety percent of patent
lawsuits would go away, and most patent litigation would be in the
chemical and pharmaceutical industries. Some will suggest this would
be a good idea.'48 We express no opinion on that issue here, other
144. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 4-5, 92 (2009).
145. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 3, at 535; Carl Shapiro, Prior User
Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, at 92; Vermont, supra note 72, at 484; John S.
Liebovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2286-87
(2002). Others have suggested that inadvertent infringers should pay only compensatory
damages, not face injunctive relief. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1818-19 (2007) (noting that if
"the problem of good-faith 'encroachment' became serious enough in patent law, a limited
good-faith user defense with damages rather than injunctive remedies would be
appropriate." But as Mike Carrier has observed, such a rule would effectively end
injunctive relief in the overwhelming majority of patent cases, something Smith would
likely oppose. See Michael A. Carrier, Why Modularity Does Not (and Should Not)
Explain Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 95, 99 (2007),
http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/592.pdf ("Smith does not explain how his enthusiasm
for injunctions addresses these problems, makes sense in light of reasonable patent trends
moving in the other direction, or is consistent with his preference for a damages remedy
for inadvertent infringers.").
147. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (setting forth the specific critique of
such a defense).
148. Jim Bessen and Mike Meurer, for example, present data suggesting that the patent
system is only working in those industries. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT
RISK 15 (2008).
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than to point out precisely how different such a patent system would
be from the one we have today.
B. Calibrating Patent Damages
Our findings bear on one significant set of judicial and policy
debates-those over the appropriate measure of damages in patent
infringement cases. Unlike copyright and trade secret law, which
provide that prevailing plaintiffs can recover not only for their own
losses but also the defendant's gains,1 49 and in some cases far more
than that,15° patent law since at least 1946 has limited the award of
damages to those adequate to compensate the plaintiff for its losses.
151
Compensatory patent damages take one of two forms-lost profits, if
the plaintiff can prove she lost profits, and a reasonable royalty in all
other cases.
152
In recent years, courts have awarded greater and greater
damages under the reasonable royalty theory, in part because they
have ignored mechanisms designed to avoid overcompensation in
complex industries 153 but in part also because they were influenced by
the perceived need to deter infringement. In Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling154 for example, the court affirmed an award of
"reasonable" royalties more than six times the actual royalty charged
for use of patented seeds, in part to avoid a "windfall" to the infringer
and in part because "of the savings Mr. McFarling achieved by his
infringement, the benefits to Monsanto from requiring farmers to
adhere to the terms of its standard licensing agreement, and the
benefits conferred by the patented technology over the use of
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2006); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (providing for statutory damages that can exceed actual
damages by a factor of thousands in extreme cases).
151. 35 U.S.C. § 284 was amended in 1946 to eliminate the disgorgement remedy.
152. See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir.
1978) ("When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent owner is
entitled to a reasonable royalty.").
153. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits From Reasonable Royalties,
50 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 6-13), available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1133173#; Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1991, 2020-25 (2007); Brian
J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 263, 277 (2007).
154. 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007). One of the authors represented McFarling in this
case.
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conventional seeds." '55 In so doing, the court imported the concept of
unjust enrichment into the damages calculation. And in other cases
the Federal Circuit has similarly granted reasonable royalty awards
that significantly exceed the amount required to compensate patent
owners."6 At least in part, those decisions, too, have done so to deter
patent infringement, as in Monsanto Co. v. Ralph.'57 But even where
deterrence is not an explicit rationale, the court seems increasingly to
consider the profit the defendant makes from infringement to be fair
game in the reasonable royalty calculus, as in McFarling and
Golight.158
Our data suggest that the incorporation of unjust enrichment and
deterrence concepts into reasonable royalty law is a mistake. With
very few exceptions, defendants are not making a calculated decision
to infringe a patent. The overwhelming majority of defendants are
independent developers who were unaware of the existence of the
patent when they made their product design decisions. And those
who were aware of the patent and made a decision to infringe are
mostly generic pharmaceutical companies subject to a special set of
rules that make the application of reasonable royalty law implausible
in the extreme."5 9 Less than 4% of complaints in our database even
155. Id. at 980-81 (emphasis added).
156. See Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (approving a
royalty which far exceeded the defendant's profit from infringement); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding a reasonable royalty
that exceeded the infringer's profits from the product). For a discussion of this issue, see,
for example, Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New
Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307, 323-66 (2006).
157. 382 F.3d at 1384. To be sure, there was substantial reason to believe that Ralph
was a bad actor. For a discussion of the role of intent in damages theory, see, for example,
Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 1, 5-44 (2001), and Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement A
Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1185-87 (2008).
158. Some scholars have expressly argued for this approach, suggesting that because an
"option to infringe" is valuable to the defendant, that value needs to be conveyed to the
patentee. Jerry A. Hausman et al., Patent Damages and Real Options: How Judicial
Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 830-31 (2007).
159. In pharmaceutical patent cases, the generic must notify the patentee before selling
a generic product, and the patentee is entitled to an automatic thirty-month stay of those
sales pending its infringement suit. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV) (West Supp. 2008);
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). If that thirty-month period expires, courts can enter preliminary
injunctions, and, even if they don't, generic companies are often afraid to enter the market
"at risk." As a result, most pharmaceutical patent cases never involve claims of damages
at all. And if they do, those damages will almost certainly be the patent owner's lost
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involve allegations of copying that might justify a deterrence-related
"kicker"' 16 of the sort that is increasingly showing up in Federal
Circuit case law. For the same reason, the scholarship that suggests
treating the "choice" to infringe as a real option for which the
infringer should have to pay'61 misses the point: overwhelmingly,
infringers are not choosing to infringe, but are designing products in
ignorance of the patent in ways that are later found to infringe.
162
We aren't suggesting that damages aren't appropriate for patent
infringement-far from it. But deterrence and unjust enrichment are
concepts designed to punish and therefore discourage infringement;
they have no place in a patent regime where virtually all infringement
is unintentional.
In the rare cases where infringement is intentional, patent law
provides for treble damages for willful infringement.1 63  A second
finding in our data, though, is that "willfulness" as the term is used in
patent law bears little resemblance to intentional copying. To begin,
we note that 157 of 193 plaintiffs (81.3%) in our complaint database
alleged willfulness even though only 21 alleged copying-establishing
no statistically significant relationship between allegations of
willfulness and copying."6  And while we did find a statistically
significant relationship between these two allegations in the opinion
profits, not a reasonable royalty, since by hypothesis the generic has copied a drug the
patent owner is currently selling on the market, depriving that patent owner of a sale.
160. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978),
established the concept of a "kicker" to account for otherwise-uncompensated losses. Id.
at 1158-59. The Federal Circuit rejected the kicker idea in Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard Co., 79
F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that no "kicker" is permissible on top of the
reasonable royalty to compensate for attorney's fees or litigation expenses; patentee must
prove case is exceptional to recover such expenses), but has reimported it under other
names. See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 951 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(permitting "[d]iscretionary increases"); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (allowing for "an increase in the reasonable royalty determined by the
court").
161. See Hausman et al., supra note 158; J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking,
and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714,
736-41 (2008).
162. To be sure, one could envision a market in which patents were easy to identify,
interpret, and license, and in such a hypothetical world it might make sense to require all
companies to search for and license patents before beginning any research or production
product. But we do not live in that world. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19 (2008).
163. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
164. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (finding a p-value of 0.7077).
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dataset, 65 the percentage of cases where there was such a correlation
was still very low (17.70%). The percentage stayed low when looking
at cases where willfulness was actually decided, with only 20 (25.97%)
of the cases deciding the willfulness issue mentioning an allegation of
copying. And when willfulness was found, an allegation or finding of
copying did not necessarily follow. In the 42 cases finding willful
infringement, only 11 (26.19%) contained an allegation of copying
and only 7 (16.67%) found copying.1 66 In fact, two cases found willful
infringement while explicitly finding no copying.
16 7
This data suggests a mismatch between the goals of willfulness
law-to deter intentional conduct-and its application in the courts.
The Federal Circuit changed the standard for willfulness in 2007 and
now requires proof of "objective recklessness "168 -a standard still less
than intentional conduct but more stringent than the duty of due care
that preceded it. It remains to be seen whether this new standard will
bring claims of willfulness more in line with the subset of cases
involving claims of intentional conduct.
C. Patents, Disclosure, and Technology Transfer
Our data may also shed some light on the role of the patent
system in encouraging technology transfer. The patent cases we
studied were not, by and large, cases about a defendant learning the
invention from the plaintiff. That doesn't mean that technology
transfer from patentees to others-or even copying of inventions-
doesn't happen in the patent system, of course. We expect that
patent licensing involves technology transfer (as opposed to merely
an agreement to forebear from suit) in a wide variety of contexts,
from university licenses to start-ups to joint ventures to international
165. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (finding a p-value of < 0.0001).
166. As a point of contrast, James Bessen and Michael Meurer found that 44% (30 of
68) of cases finding willfulness included a finding of copying. See BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 148, at 277 n. 5. Bessen and Meurer's numbers come from a much older
dataset-compiled in 2000 by now Judge Kimberly Moore. Id.
167. Baden Sports, Inc. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Molten, No. C06-210MJP, 2007 WL
2790777, at *4-6 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2007) (choosing not to enhance damages even
though willful infringement was found); Floe Intern., Inc. v. Newmans' Mfg. Inc., No. 04-
5120(DWF/RLE), 2006 WL 2472112, at *2, 6 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2006) (choosing to
enhance damages).
168. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
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outsourcing of production. 169 But it does suggest that patent litigation
today is not about policing failed efforts at technology transfer, but
rather about efforts by patent owners to enforce their right of
exclusivity or to collect revenue from independent creators. As a
corollary, it may well be that judicial or legislative efforts to curb
abuse of patent litigation will have no significant adverse effect on the
technology transfer function of the patent system, though it is
important to make sure that efforts to limit the very real problem of
litigation abuse don't spill over into attacks on patent rights more
generally.
Our data do provide some inferential support for those who have
argued that the disclosure function of the patent system isn't working
terribly well. Most defendants in patent infringement lawsuits are not
copiers-meaning they were not knowingly using already-patented
technology as the basis for an improvement or attempting to design-
around a patented technology. This should not be surprising. A
variety of evidence already suggests that scientists in most industries
rarely read patents, and that even if they did, those patents aren't a
particularly good means of conveying technical information.17 The
fact that few, if any, people appear to be copying technology from
patent owners is consistent with this argument, though it is not proof
that people aren't copying inventions after the expiration of their
patents, copying patents and then voluntarily paying licenses, or
successfully designing-around.
D. Choosing Between Patents and Trade Secrets
Finally, our results have implications for the relationship
between patents and trade secrets. The traditional approach to this
relationship, both by courts and commentators, views inventors as
choosing between patent and trade secret protection.' In the
traditional view, patents are superior to trade secrets because they
169. See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 93-95 (2001)
(investigating and documenting IP-related technology transfer); Joshua S. Gans et al., The
Impact of Uncertain Intellectual Property Rights on the Market for Ideas: Evidence From
Patent Grant Delays (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13234, 2007),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13234.pdf (finding substantial licensing of
technology even before a patent issues).
170. Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560-62 (2009); Lemley,
supra note 162, at 21-22.
171. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Oil Co., 416 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1974); CRAIG
NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 785-86 (2008).
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give the public the benefit of the invention, and so the law weakens
trade secret protection sufficiently that users are inclined to choose
patent protection instead.72 Similarly, in this view, if patent law is
weakened too much, inventors will choose instead to rely on secrecy,
and the public domain will be impoverished as a result.
Our findings cast substantial doubt on this traditional story.
Trade secret law punishes only misappropriation of one's ideas by
another-that is, copying. Because patent plaintiffs are
overwhelmingly suing to prevent independent development, trade
secret law would not help them. Further, in the only class of cases
where defendants are copying the plaintiff's invention with great
regularity-pharmaceutical cases-the regulatory structure of the
market will likely preclude reliance on trade secret law. As a result,
patent litigants don't face much of a choice. No matter how much
patent law is weakened, they are unlikely to switch to secrecy,




Patents are fundamentally different from other types of IP rights.
The patent litigation system does not appear to operate to prevent
copying. Instead, it gives patent owners control primarily over
independent invention by third parties. There may be good reasons
to give patent owners this control, whether to give inventors extra
incentives or perhaps to create more certain rights that more easily
can be licensed. But debates over the patent system-and legal rules
that set remedies for infringement-should not be based on the
assumption that patent infringers are "thieves" or "copiers." The
evidence we offer in that paper suggests that that assumption is
wrong.
172. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 489-90. For a discussion of the choices actually
made by inventors, which are more complicated, see Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 338-41 (2009).
173. There is, however, a question about an inventor's perception on the front-end. If
the rhetoric of copying is as strong as it seems to be, there might be reason to believe that
inventors think (wrongly, as our data establishes) that the value in the patent lies in
keeping out potential copyists. Inventors may have the misperception that patent law's
capturing of independent creation is only a marginal benefit. For those inventors with this
perception, opting for trade secrecy is a real (if misguided) possibility.
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